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LEGAL FRONTIERS IN PRISON GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY
DAVID STERNBERG
The author is a member of the bar of the State of New York and holds a master's degree in sociology. He teaches sociology at Brooklyn College and is a research associate with the Columbia Bureau
of Applied Social Research. Mr. Sternberg is the author of Synanon House-A Consideration Of Its
Implicationsfor American Correction,which was published in Volume 54 Number 4 of this Journal.
The increasing reliance by prison psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers upon the use of
group therapy and psychodrama techniques has led the author to raise new and provocative questions concerning the possible infringement upon the constitutional and civil rights of the prisoners
who participate in such therapy programs.-EDITOR.

Discussions about correctional group psychotherapy are legion in today's American criminological and penological literature. Most of them
touch on one aspect or another of the central
question: How effective is group psychotherapy
in the rehabilitation of offenders? Specific issues
within the framework of that key question deal
with such well-known problems as (1) the most
adequate and effective psychotherapeutic approach to use in the groups, e.g., Freudian psychoanalytic or Sullivanian role-oriented, or psychodramatic action-oriented, and (2) the most
effective classification and selection procedures for
forming therapy groups (e.g., Are groups composed of members possessing a crucial common
problem, such as drug addiction, alcoholism or
professional thievery, better calculated to generate strong change forces than those comprised of
inmates with unlike "criminal behavior systems?").
On the other hand, legal issues or obstacles that
might confront American prison group therapy
are rarely, if ever, examined in the literature. It
is to such legal considerations that I address
myself in this Note, and I do so for two reasons.
First, I would contend that the recent extensive
development of prison group psychotherapy
programs in the United States has brought in its
train certain serious questions in the fields of
constitutional, administrative and even tort law
of which few are yet aware but which could burst
into sight and urgently demand answers at any
time in the future. Perhaps we can cushion ourselves from a "surprise attack" if we have thought
a bit about these possible developments in advance.
My second reason for bringing up legal issues is
less direct or practical. I do not think we can
regard all of the unanticipated legal consequences

to be depicted below as equally probable or important. Many will no doubt never emerge in
actual court cases or in legislative hearings (although I have little doubt that some will). Nevertheless I see the general discussion of a range of
possible unforeseen legal results as a useful exercise in what might be called, to paraphrase Everett
Hughes,' "the criminological imagination." The
clashes between specific sections of American law
and correctional group psychotherapy that are
going to be "imagined" here will perhaps tell us
something new about both, something which
helps us to take stock of their present individual
conditions as well as their relationship to each
other at crucial points. If the reader detects signs
of an extreme position in what follows (particularly
in the first section) it stems from a conviction that
the role of devil's advocate is most appropriate
when attempting to get the most mileage out of
the criminological imagination.
The ideas to be presented apply to most types
of prison group psychotherapy that are being
carried on today (whether they be psychoanalytic
or socioanalytic). They are not, on the other hand,
'2
particularly relevant to "group counselling
programs, which I take to differ from group
psychotherapy mainly in that the counselling
programs make no attempt to explore and expose
the deeply personal feelings (e.g., fears, fantasies,
anxieties) of members in the group, whereas such
explorations are central to psychotherapy in an
individual or group form.
I Hughes, Race Relations and the Sociological Imagination, 28 AaMR. Soc. Rxv. 889-890 (1963).

2 For an account of the distinction between group
counselling and group psychotherapy procedures similar to that used in this article, see McCorkle, Group

Therapy in the Treatment of Ofenders, FED. PROB.

22 (Dec. 1952).
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PRISON PSYCHOTHERAPY
I. Is PRISON GRouP PSYCHOTHERAPY
CONSTITUTIONAL?

My basic question, which may startle some, is
whether group psychotherapy in prison can be
construed as violating the federal (and often
state) constitutional prohibition against "cruel
and unusual punishments." May the state strip
an individual of his psychic privacy, a stripping
which appears to be one of the avowed intentions
of nearly all kinds of group psychotherapy programs? The argument may be presented that to
force the individual to recall painful and embarrassing incidents in his life, to subject him to the group
derision of other inmates in therapy, and to create
constant anxiety about his role-performances,
is to exceed the bounds of what the state may
constitutionally do to a commited offender.
The deprivation of physical privacy in penitentiaries has been upheld, when challenged on
legal grounds, along lines of custodial necessity. 3
That is, one can demonstrate quite clearly the
practical reasons why large groups of men must
be herded together for purposes of easy surveillance. But are the justifications for the "psychic
herding" which results from group therapy so
clear and persuasive as the ones which support
the taking away of physical privacy in the prison?
At this time a large controversy exists as to the
efficacy of group psychotherapy techniques in
rehabilitating offenders. Whether it is superior
to other kinds of treatment, equally effective, or
less effective has not yet been satisfactorily determined. Now the implementation of group
therapy programs, and the consequent removal of
much psychic privacy for the inmate who participates, stems from convictions (which are
frequently not supported by control-group research) on the part of administrators and penologists that such procedures are effective in
producing conforming value orientation and behavior patterns in inmates. So long as one can
demonstrate that such programs are effective,
the "cruel and unusual punishment" argument
against them may appear to fall. That is, the
programs may in fact be cruel and/or unusualcruel because they involve painful psychic exposure, and unusual because they involve a
revolutionary and still relatively infrequently
used method-but they will be construed as
therapy and not punishment since they bring

about positive results. If, however, one were to
marshall the professional literature, especially in
psychiatry, 4 which militates against the efficacy
of group therapy in both non-correctional and
correctional settings, it would become possible
to present a serious case that such programs were
in fact "cruel and unusual punishments" regardless of the purer therapeutic intentions of the
administrators.
Voluntary Participation in Group Psychotherapy
It might be contended that the inmate in group
psychotherapy has waived his right to psychic
privacy by voluntarily agreeing to participate
in the therapy program. But here we are faced
with the interpretation of that chameleon term
"voluntary". How voluntary is one's decision to
participate in a program "recommended" by prison
psychiatrists or caseworkers if the inmate believes his refusal to participate in a therapy
program will be interpreted by prison officials as
the kind of lack of cooperation which might thwart
an early parole date or restrict prison privileges?
Under those kinds of pressure conditions one might
anticipate frequent participations which were
voluntary only in a highly formal sense.
Then again, many inmates, unfamiliar with the
procedures and probings of group psychotherapy,
may volunteer for treatment without appreciating
the possible emotional shocks. American courts are
beginning to hold that medical doctors must inform patients upon whom they intend to operate
about the nature and risks of such surgery. That
is, the patient's "blanket" permission to the
doctor to operate which has been given without
full knowledge of the range of possible outcomes,
is now being subject to challenge as insufficient
to constitute the kind of "voluntary permission"
which will absolve the doctor from possible tort
liability. 5 One might profitably apply the rationale
of this recent patient-doctor-operation doctrine
when appraising the voluntary agreement to
participate in prison group psychotherapy.
These observations should not be taken as an
assertion that all, or even a majority, of group
therapy programs in prisons fail to implement
voluntary participation in a genuine and meaningful sense of that concept. Nevertheless, enough are

4 For a discussion of and citations to objections to
the use of group psychotherapy that some psychiatrists
and psychologists have made, see CoRsINI, METHODS
3 Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique oF GROUP PsYcHoTnIRAPY 50-54 (1957).
of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts,
, This emerging doctrine in tort law is known as the
72 YALE L. J. 506, 520-524 (1963).
doctrine of "informed consent."
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tinged with factors of discrimination against nonjoiners or with ignorance on the part of those who
agree to join about the nature of therapy, to
make statements about waivers of psychic privacy
(which might imply waivers of certain constitutional guarantees) through voluntary participation problematical, and a matter for empirical
verification in particular cases.
We can note that the history of judicial relations
with American prisons indicates that courts are
chary to interfere with post-conviction correctional
policy in any event. One major reason for the
"hands off" policy that the courts continually
employ is that their interference with or questioning of prison administrators' actions would tend
seriously to undermine the authority of men
charged with the custody of dangerous criminals.6
Then too, as part of a state agency, a prison administration enjoys the great degree of discretionary freedom that courts have traditionally
accorded administrative bodies in general.7 The
substance of a convict's constitutional claim has
thus to first reckon with unusually heavy opposition concerned with a primary issue, i.e., jurisdiction, before it may be heard on the merits.
II. PRisoN GRoun' PSycHOTHERAPY, PRIVUGED
COMMUNICATIONS AND CONFmENTIALITY

The "cruel and unusual punishment" objection
to prison group psychotherapy, with whatever
force it may or may not be urged, derives from the
emotional punishment a member may receive
within a therapy group. Different types of unsolved legal tangles emerge when we begin to
consider the nature of obligations the therapist
has to his inmate patients, and the obligations
the inmates have to one another, in keeping therapy session material confidential outside the group.
Although we will limit our attention, for the most
part to the prison situation, it may strike the
reader that some of the problems confronted here
have relevance as well for group psychotherapy
practised in the free community.
Before we treat the group situation it seems
necessary to examine the legal concept of privilege
between therapist and patient in individual prison
therapy. A privileged communication statute
gives a patient the right to prevent his therapist
(if the therapist is a psychiatrist or psychologist)
from testifying in a hearing or trial about therapeutic or medical matters discussed in treatment.
6 Yale Law Journal Note, supra note 3, pp. 506-558.
Ibid., page 509.
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Whether privileged communication laws allow a
convict to prevent his therapist from testifying
in a trial or hearing is uncertain, may well depend on the time element s But the important
point to stress here, I think, is that privileged
communication statutes cannot bar the prison
therapist from divulging the materials of treatment sessions to the warden or parole board.
Prison administrative decisions and parole board
meetings are presumably not judicial hearings
within the meaning of doctor-patient privileged
communication statutes.
Probably, however, as in free community cases,
the therapist in prison is duty bound to refrain
from divulging intimate information about patients to "improper" persons, such as other inmates and third persons in general who have no
official duty of rehabilitation toward inmates.
This obligation to keep information confidential
is regulated by mechanisms beyond privileged
communication statutes: In some cases certain
causes of action in tort (e.g., libel or invasion of
privacy) may be available. More important,
therapists are controlled by private codes of ethics
promulgated by therapeutic associations (e.g.,
the American Medical Association or the clinical
section of the American Psychiatric Association)
to which they belong. Breaching of professional
confidences would bring censure or even expulsion
from such bodies. This powerful deterrent applies to institutional, as well as non-institutional,
therapy.
The group psychotherapy situation, though,
introduces a complicating new variable into the
discussion of confidentiality. The fundamental
relationship of trust between the therapist and
each of the patients is not altered: the therapist
is still under the same obligation against divulging
materials about each and all of the patients in
the group to "improper" persons. 9 But it would
appear that the inmates have no well-defined
legal or privately sanctioned duties which prevent
them from breaching psychic confidences made in
8That is, whether the trial took place during the
prisoner's incarceration, while he was on parole or
when his sentence had entirely expired. In many states
the deprivation of civil rights connected with conviction of a felony might prevent a convict from exercising
a privileged communication objection to testimony
while
under sentence.
9
Prison group psychotherapists will, more likely
than not, have their confidentiality duties regulated by
group psychotherapy associations such as the American
Group Psychotherapy Association. Some will no doubt
also belong to professional groups principally concerned with individual therapy as well.
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group sessions. Convicts are not threatened, as
therapists are, by expulsion from coveted membership in a professional organization. Nor are such
tort actions as libel as certain and available for
convicts as for free persons, since the right of pris10
oners to bring law suits may be greatly limited.
Thus it would appear that patients are vulnerable to the constant threat or danger that other
patients may report on their sometimes damaging
personal revelations to inmates not involved in
their group therapy, or may even publicize such
revelations beyond the prison walls to persons in
the free community. The danger that patients
will violate confidences is present in non-institutional group psychotherapy as well, but it is
peculiarly threatening and ubiquitous in closed
social system settings like prisons where grapevine
communication is swift and sure and men, unlike
patients in the free community, have little chance
of avoiding each other in their daily routines.
There is no way of knowing whether challenges
concerning the inadequate rules of confidentiality
will erupt first in the free community or in some
kind of institutional group psychotherapy situation. The fact, however, that group therapy
programs have mushroomed of recent years in
prisons, combined with the peculiar dangers of
breached confidences in a prison society, makes
such programs good potential targets for initial
battles. Wherever such challenges occur, they are
bound to have repercussions along the entire range
of free and captive group psychotherapy settings.
Group psychotherapy, both inside and outside of
correctional institutions, has brought a host of
problems that present legal concepts controlling
individual therapy seem inadequate to handle.
Should group patients be enjoined from testifying
in court as to what transpires in group meetings?
If one sees all the members of a group as therapeutic agents for one another (a view very strong
indeed in group psychotherapy literature) it
becomes reasonable, even compelling, to suggest
an extension of the privileged communication law
to seal all members' lips in trials and hearings.
Beyond the issue of legal testimony, I know of no
10TAPPAN, CR=, JusncE Aim CORRECION 427429 (1960).

case law which defines the rights and duties of
group therapy members to each other in general
problems of disclosure."
CONCLUSION
I have tried briefly to indicate some of the legal
frontiers toward which prison group psychotherapy
may be swiftly moving. To some extent I have
attempted to use "criminological imagination"
by taking the present state of certain areas of
American law (e.g., constitutional and privileged
communication law) on the one hand, and the
current condition of prison group psychotherapy
on the other, and then "imagining" conflicts
that could occur between them, assuming they
keep moving in their respective directions.
Some of these frontier conflicts seem exclusively
pertinent to the captive group therapy situation,
e.g., the constitutional question about "cruel and
unusual punishments," whereas others, such as
the problem of interpatient confidentiality, loom
ahead on both free and institutional fronts.
The discussion did not examine particular group
therapy programs in particular prisons, nor the
specific laws of any states. Rather it dealt with
elements of group psychotherapy and law which
seem to be more or less applicable from one
program to another and one state to another. It is
recognized that such a presentation is bound to
distort the picture for certain prisons or states.
It is thus for the persons concerned with particular
group psychotherapy prison programs in various
parts of the United States to determine what
relevance, or lack of it, the reflections in this
article may have for them.
n The range of possible difficulties and dilemmas
here is very great. Just to take one example from private practice group psychotherapy: Member X during
the course of a discussion of his anxieties he experiences
in his work as a director of Company A happens to
reveal confidential financial information about his
company. This information is valuable to Member B
who is a director of Company B. Is there any legal
procedure which could be taken by Member A or his
company to prevent Member B and Company B from
using such knowledge to the disadvantage of Company
A? Further, assuming the information is used, are there
any legal causes of action that Member A or Company
A has against Member B or Company B to obtain
redress?

